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Abstract
We present DFTSim, a simulation tool for dynamic fault trees (DFT).
The simulation is carried out by directly sampling the failure distri-
butions attached to the leaves (called basic events) of the tree and
propagating the failure times upwards in the tree.
Sampling the distributions of the DFT leaves is however not ob-
vious. To sample from the correct distributions, the analytical ex-
pression of the failure distributions of all basic events (BE) must be
known. These are indeed known for non-spare BEs; but for spare
BEs, they become conditional on the failure of other BEs. Hence,
the derivation of the analytical expression of the spares’ failure dis-
tributions and their sampling is not a trivial task.
We evaluate DFTSim by applying it on an extensive benchmark
comprised of seven case studies. We compare its results to two other
DFT-based reliability tools (namely Galileo and Coral) that, rather
than giving simulation-based estimates, compute exact measures.
Our simulation-based approach is, in particular for large DFTs,
much faster than the existing approaches. In fact, the computation
time of the exact solution methods is exponential in the number
of DFT leaves, whereas simulation time is linear in the number
of leaves. Moreover, DFTSim (and simulation in general) allows to
simulate a wide range of distributions and evaluate Markovian as
well as non-Markovian models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Dynamic fault trees (DFT) [7][9] are a popular, graphical formal-
ism for reliability analysis. DFTs model the failures of a system in
terms of the failures of its components. They consist of basic events,
at the leaves of the tree, modeling basic component failures; and
gates that indicate how failures combine and result in a system fail-
ure. Basic events (or components) can be either used as spares or
non-spares. Six different DFT gates allow the reliability engineer
to express complex functional and temporal dependencies between
system components. Recently, we have extended DFTs [2] and in-
creased their modeling power by allowing spares to be any inde-
pendent subsystem (as opposed to only basic events) and the FDEP
gates to trigger the failure of any gate and not only basic events (c.f.
Section 2.1). This paper considers extended DFTs. In the sequel, we
call standard DFTs the non-extended version of DFTs.
The standard DFT formalism has been around for nearly two
decades and has been implemented in several tools (e.g. Galileo
[14], Relex [6], and Coral [1] tools). These tools convert a stan-
dard DFT into a (homogeneous or non-homogeneous) continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC), and suffer from the well known state-
space explosion problem. Indeed, as the DFT grows larger, there
is an exponential increase in the memory-space needed and the
computation-time required to solve the DFT.
A simulation-based approach of standard DFTs has been sug-
gested (but not implemented) in [11] as a possible solution tech-
nique. In this paper, we propose DFTSim, a tool for simulating
extended DFTs, where the input DFT file is compatible with the
Galileo and the Coral textual DFT format. Such compatibility is
indeed desired because it allows interoperability and integration
among these DFT tools.
One of the major problems in DFT simulation-based approaches
is to sample from the correct distributions. In order to carry out such
sampling the analytical expression of the failure distributions of all
basic events must be known. Such failure distributions are indeed
known for non-spare basic events; unfortunately, for spare basic
events the failure distribution becomes conditional on the primary’s
(i.e. the component to be replaced) failure time, and the derivation
of the analytical expression of the spare failure distribution becomes
a non-trivial task (see Section 5 for details). In this paper, we rely
on previous work we have conducted in order to derive the cor-
rect form of these failure distributions’ analytical expressions using
continuous-time Bayesian networks [3].
As the DFT grows, simulation becomes considerably more ef-
ficient than state-based solution approaches (as implemented in e.g.
Galileo and Coral). In fact, as we will see in Section 7, the simulation
time grows linearly with the size of the DFT (i.e. O(NE), where N is
the number of samples taken and E the number of elements, i.e. gates
and basic events) and memory consumption remains low. Another
advantage of DFTSim is the handling of any type of failure distri-
bution. In addition to fixed probability1 and exponential distribution
(i.e. constant failure rate), DFTSim allows for (1) time-dependent
failure rates (resulting in non-homogeneous CTMCs) characterizing
failure distributions such as the Weibull distribution, and (2) failure
rates which are individually functions of more than one time vari-
able (i.e. there is not a single global “clock” in the system, but rather
more than one “clock” upon which failure rates may depend). In
the latter case, the model is non-Markovian and the presence of a
cold (i.e. can not fail while not in use) spare basic event having a
Weibull distribution is a concrete example of such a model. To our
knowledge, there is not a software tool that provides a correct ana-
lytical/numerical solution to this kind of DFT models.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is
divided as follows: In Section 2, we introduce DFTs, followed by
an overview of the simulation methodology in Section 3. In Section
4, we provide details on how to compute activation times, which
are necessary for sampling the failure distributions. In Section 5, we
present the sampling method per se for spare and non-spare basic
events as well as gates. Section 6 gives some details on the DFTSim
tool implementation and Section 7 presents a benchmark of seven
1Interpreted as a uniform distribution.
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case studies evaluated using DFTSim and compared to two other re-
liability tools, namely Galileo and Coral. Section 8 discusses related
work. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper and suggests future re-
search.
2 DFT BACKGROUND
A DFT is a tree (or rather, a directed acyclic graph) in which the
leaves are called basic events (BEs) and the other elements are gates.
The (unique) top or root gate represents the overall system failure.
BEs model the failure of physical/logical non-repairable compo-
nents and are depicted by circles. The failure of a BE is governed
by a certain distribution. An example of such a distribution is the ex-
ponential distribution where the probability that the BE fails within
t time units equals 1− e−λt (λ is the failure rate of the BE). Note
that the failure rate λ can be time dependent, and thus non-constant
and resulting in a non-exponential failure distribution. The non-leaf
elements are gates, modeling how the component failures induce a
system failure. Static fault trees have three type of (static) gates: the
AND gate, the OR gate and the K/M (also called KofM or VOTING)
gate, depicted in Figure 1(a), (b), and (c) respectively. These gates
fail if respectively all, at least one, or at least K out of M of their
inputs fail.
Dynamic fault trees [7] extend static FTs with three novel types
of gates2: The priority AND gate (PAND); the Spare gate (SPARE),
modeling the management and allocation of spare components; and
the functional dependency gate (FDEP). These gates (depicted in
Figure 1(d), (e), and (f)) are described below.
Figure 1. DFT gates and example.
PAND gate. The PAND gate models a failure sequence de-
pendency. It fails if all of its inputs fail from left to right order in the
gate’s depiction. If the inputs fail in a different order, the gate does
not fail.
Spare gate. The Spare gate has one primary input and zero
(which is a degenerated case) or more alternate inputs called spares.
The primary input of a Spare gate is initially powered on and the
alternate inputs are in standby mode. When the primary fails, it is
2A fourth gate called ‘Sequence Enforcing’ (SEQ) gate has also been
defined in [7], but it turns out that this gate is expressible in terms of the cold
spare gate.
replaced by the first available alternate input (which then switches
from the standby mode to the active mode). In turn, when this alter-
nate input fails, it is replaced by the next available alternate input,
and so on.
In standby (or dormant) mode, the BE failure rate λ is reduced
by a dormancy factor α ∈ [0,1]. Thus, the BE failure rate in standby
mode is αλ. In active mode, the failure rate switches back to λ. Two
special cases arise if α = 0 or α = 1. If α = 0, the spare is called a
cold spare and can not, by definition, fail before the primary. When
α = 1, the spare is called a hot spare and its failure rate is the same
whether in standby or in active mode. If 0 < α < 1, the spare is
called a warm spare. The Spare gate fails when the primary and all
its spares have failed or are unavailable (i.e. used by other Spare
gates).
Multiple Spare gates can share a pool of spares. When the pri-
mary unit of any of the Spare gates fails, it is replaced by the first
available (i.e. not failed, or unavailable because it is taken by an-
other Spare gate) spare unit; which becomes, in turn, the active unit
for that Spare gate.
FDEP gate. The functional dependency gate consists of a trig-
ger event (i.e. a failure) and a set of dependent events (or com-
ponents). When the trigger event occurs, it causes all the depen-
dent components to become inaccessible or unusable (the dependent
components can of course also still fail by themselves). The FDEP
gate’s output is a ‘dummy’ output (i.e. it is not taken into account
during the calculation of the system failure probability).
2.1 Extended DFT
In a nutshell, the extended DFT formalism allows spares to be
any independent subsystem or module (as opposed to only BEs as
originally defined in [7]) and the FDEP gates to trigger the failure of
any gate and not only BEs. We refer to these as the spare-extension
and FDEP-extension respectively. The interested reader may see [2]
for details on these extensions. In the remainder of the paper, we
consider the extended version of DFTs.
2.2 DFT Example
Figure 1(g) shows a DFT modeling a hypothetical road trip.
Looking at the top PAND gate, we see that the road trip fails (i.e.
we are stuck on the road) if the car fails after the mobile phone has
failed; if the car fails first, then we can call the road services to tow
the car and continue our journey. The car fails if either the engine
fails or the tire subsystem fails, as modeled by the OR gate labeled
‘Car fails’. The car is equipped with a spare tire, which can be used
to replace any of the primary tires. When a second tire fails, the tire
subsystem fails, causing in turn a car failure. Thus, we model the
tire subsystem by four spare gates, each having a primary tire (BEs
‘Tire 1’, ‘Tire 2’,‘Tire 3’, and ‘Tire 4’) and all sharing a cold spare
tire (BE ‘Spare tire’).
3 SIMULATION METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW
The overall simulation procedure consists of generating n sam-
ples. For each sample, we record the overall system (i.e. DFT top
gate) failure-time. Each sample is obtained by applying the follow-
ing two steps:
1. Randomly sample each BE in the tree according to its (condi-
tional) failure distribution, and thus obtaining a sample failure-
time for each BE.
2. Propagate the obtained BEs’ failure-times through the DFT
gates. Once the top gate is reached, record this sample system
failure-time.
The simulation ends and returns n samples of system failure-
time which represent samples from the system’s failure probabil-
ity distribution. Various measures can now be derived such as the
system reliability given a specified mission time, the system Mean-
Time-To-Failure (MTTF), etc.
Given a set S1,S2, · · · ,Sn of system failure-time samples; we can,
for instance, compute the system reliability R (given a mission time
T ) using the following unbiased estimator [13]:
ˆR =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
I{Si>T}, (1)
where I{Si>T} is an indicator function; i.e., I{Si>T} = 1 if Si > T
and 0 otherwise. The estimator ˆR is called the crude Monte Carlo
estimator. Given a confidence level α ∈ [0,1], the approximate (1-
α) confidence interval for R is given by [13]:(
ˆR− z1−α/2
σˆ√
n
, ˆR+ z1−α/2
σˆ√
n
)
, (2)
where σˆ is the samples standard deviation and z1−α/2 is the (1-α/2)
quantile of the standard normal distribution.
In the sequel, prior to explaining each of the two simulation steps,
we first need to compute the BEs’ activation times.
4 ACTIVATION TIME
For each (spare) BE in the tree, we need to determine its
activation-time (i.e. the time when it switches from a dormant mode
to an active mode) as this affects the shape of its failure distribu-
tion. The simplest configuration for a spare BE is when a BE A is a
spare-input (i.e. not the primary-input) to a single Spare gate, which
we assume to be the top DFT gate. In this case, A is activated when
the corresponding primary of the Spare gate fails. However, given
the spare-extension that we have defined in [2], the BE activation-
time computation becomes more involved. According to the spare-
extension, a BE can be part of a whole independent3 module act-
ing as a spare. In this case, the BE activation-time is equal to the
activation-time of the module it belongs to.
We use the following notation: given an element (i.e gate or BE)
X , we let par(X) denote a parent of X (e.g. in Figure 2(a), Y is parent
of W), and prim(X) denotes the primary of X if X is a Spare gate.
AT(X) stands for activation-time of X and FT(X) stands for failure-
time of X .
4.1 BE Activation
The rule for activating a BE is as follows:
1. If the BE A directly inputs (as a spare) to a single Spare gate X
(and possibly to other non-Spare gates), then
AT(A) = max(FT(prim(X)),AT(X)).
3See [2] for details.
2. If the BE A directly inputs (as a spare) to 2 (or more) Spare
gates X1, X2 (and possibly to other non-Spare gates), then
AT(A) = min{max{FT(prim(X1)),AT(X1)},
max{FT(prim(X2)),AT(X2)}}.
This is the case where A is shared between X1 and X2. The
minimum simply indicates that A is activated whenever the first
Spare gate activates it.
3. If the BE A inputs only to non-Spare gates (or acts as a primary
of a Spare gate), then
AT(A) = AT(par(A))
Note that any parent gate, excluding FDEP gates for which the
BE inputs as a dependent event (a design choice made in [2]),
can be picked as all parents must have the same activation-
time since we restrict ourselves to independent spare modules.
Note that in the first and second cases, the primary can be a BE
or a whole subtree (i.e. any gate except an FDEP). Furthermore, if
A is the nth spare of the Spare gate X , then the primary’s failure-
time is defined as the maximum of the failure-times of the pri-
mary and all n− 1 preceding spares, i.e. FT(prim(X)) is replaced
by max{FT(prim(X)),FT(spare 1), · · · ,FT(spare n-1)}.
4.2 Gate Activation
We have defined the BE activation-time in a recursive fashion,
using the activation-time of a gate. The activation-time of a gate is
derived using the same rules defined for the BE in Section 4.1. The
FDEP gate, whose output is a dummy output, is however an excep-
tion. When the FDEP gate A inputs (its input position being irrele-
vant) to a Spare gate X , its activation-time does not depend on the
primary’s failure-time; and cases 1 and 2 become respectively,
AT(A) = AT(X)
AT(A) = min{AT(X1),AT(X2)}.
The activation time of the top DFT gate is t = 0. It is important to
mention that the gates’ activation-times are only computed to de-
termine the BEs’ activation-times and are not subsequently used to
sample the gates’ failure distributions.
4.3 Activation Example
Applying the above rules on the DFT in Figure 2(a), we have:
- AT(T ) = AT(X) = AT(Z) = AT(A) = AT(F) = 0.
- AT(Y ) = min{max(FT(A),AT(X)),
max(FT(F),AT(Z))}= min{max(FT(A),0),
max(FT(F),0) = min{FT(A),FT(F)}.
- AT(W ) = AT(Y ) = min{FT(A),FT(F)}.
- AT(B) = AT(C) = AT(W ) = min{FT(A),FT(F)}.
- AT(D) = max(FT(W ),AT(Y )) = max(FT(W ),
min{FT(A),FT(F)}).
- AT(V ) = AT(Y ) = min{FT(A),FT(F)}.
- AT(E) = AT(V ) = min{FT(A),FT(F)}.
Figure 2. (a) Example activation-times, (b) A simple DFT.
5 FAILURE-TIME SAMPLING
Each element in the fault tree is seen as a random variable (RV)
having a certain cumulative distribution function (CDF) F . Thus,
a RV X having a CDF F represents the failure-time of element X ,
and the probability for element X to fail within time t is F(t) =
P[X ≤ t]. The analytical expression of the CDF of each dynamic
fault tree element was derived in [3]. For any DFT gate X with two4
inputs A and B, the CDF is given as a conditional CDF F(X |A,B),
where A and B are the failure-times of the gate’s inputs. F(X |A,B)
is however deterministic; i.e. if A and B are known, then the failure-
time of X has a unique value. For a BE, we distinguish between two
cases: (1) when the BE is not used as a spare, and (2) when the BE
is used as a spare (directly inputs to a Spare gate or belongs to a
spare module). In the first case, the RV X representing the BE has
an unconditional CDF F(t). For instance if BE X has an exponential
failure distribution with a failure rate λ, then F(t) = 1−e−λt . Figure
3 shows a typical CDF F(t) of a non-spare BE. In the second case,
Figure 3. Inverse transform method for a non-spare BE.
the BE is used as a spare and its failure distribution depends on its
activation-time. In fact, the BE has a conditional CDF F(t|a), where
a is its activation-time. Recall, from Section 4, that the activation-
time is a function of other elements’ failure-times. We define the
in-isolation CDF of a BE X as the unconditional CDF Fi(t) (and the
corresponding in-isolation failure (or hazard) rate λi(t)) if X were
not used as a spare. In the DFT formalism, the dormancy factor α of
a BE is a well-defined notion and means that the BE’s hazard rate
4The argumentation is the same for any number of inputs.
is reduced by a factor α when dormant and remains the same when
active, i.e.:
λd(t) = αλi(t) when dormant, and
λa(t) = λi(t) when active. (3)
For the exponential distribution λi(t) = λ (i.e. it is time-
independent). However, this is not true in the general case (e.g. for
the Weibull distribution λ(t) = kβ−1 (t/β)k−1, where k and β are
the shape and scale distribution parameters). Given the in-isolation
CDF Fi(t) and its corresponding probability density function (PDF)
fi(t), the activation-time a, and the dormancy factor α; then, the BE
conditional PDF is [4]:
f (t|a) = u(a− t)α fi(t)[1−Fi(t)]α−1 +
u(t−a) fi(t)[1−Fi(a)]α−1 (4)
where, u(x) is the unit step function5 and α > 0. The first term (i.e.
u(a− t)α fi(t)[1−Fi(t)]α−1) describes the BE failure while dormant
and thus represents the dormant failure distribution, while the sec-
ond term (i.e. u(t − a) fi(t)[1−Fi(a)]α−1) describes the BE failure
while active and thus represents the active failure distribution. For
α = 0 (i.e. cold spare), f (t|a) = u(t−a) fi(t −a) [3].
We can rewrite Equation 4 as f (t|a) = u(a − t) fd(t) + u(t −
a) fa(t), where fd(t) is the PDF during the dormant mode and fa(t)
is the PDF during the active mode. Thus, we have6:
F(t|a) =
∫ t
0
f (x|a)dx = u(a− t)Fd(t)
+u(t −a){Fd(a)+Fa(t)−Fa(a)} (5)
Note that, for a non-spare BE, with an in-isolation CDF Fi, its CDF
F(t|a) = F(t) = Fi(t).
Figure 4 shows a typical conditional CDF F(t|a) of a spare BE.
The above showed how to derive the appropriate CDF to be sampled
Figure 4. Inverse transform method for a spare BE.
for a spare BE given its in-isolation CDF, its activation time, and its
dormancy factor. The obtained CDF is in accordance with the DFT
formalism interpretation of the dormancy factor (i.e. Equation 3).
As an illustrative example, let’s consider the simple DFT shown
in Figure 2(b). The DFT consists of a spare top gate S, a primary
BE A, and spare BE B. S has a conditional PDF fS(s|a,b), A has
5u(x) = 1 for x > 0, u(x) = 12 for x = 0, and u(x) = 0 elsewhere [3].
6Fd(t) =
∫ t
0 fd(x)dx = 1−{1−Fi(t)}α and Fa(t) =
∫ t
0 fa(x)dx = {1−
Fi(a)}α−1Fi(t).
an unconditional PDF fA(a), and B has a conditional PDF fB(b|a)
(where the activation-time a is equal to A’s failure-time). Applying
the product rule for probability and given the dependencies between
the three RVs, the whole DFT possesses the following joint CDF:
F(a,b,s) = FS(s|a,b)FB(b|a)FA(a) (6)
During simulation, we sample the joint distribution by sequentially
sampling FA(a), then FB(b|a), and finally FS(s|a,b). Consequently,
we obtain one sample (a,b,s) representing A, B, and S failure-times.
Moreover, in our example, the system failure-time sample is the
value of s. In reality, we only need to sample the CDFs of BEs. In
fact, the CDF of any DFT gate is deterministic and the value of the
gate’s failure-time is known (with probability 1) given the failure-
times of its inputs. For instance, in the case of the spare gate S,
its failure-time s = max(a,b). Therefore, in our simulation frame-
work, we first sample all the BEs’ CDFs for which we get a set of
failure-times (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). We then simply propagate these
failure-times through the tree using propagation rules for each gate
(Section 5.3), which is equivalent to sampling the gates’ CDFs.
5.1 Non-spare BE Failure-time Sampling
We use the standard inverse transform method [13] to generate
samples. The inverse transform allows one to sample any distribu-
tion by generating samples from a uniform (over [0,1]) distribution.
The method works as follows: A uniform random number U is gen-
erated using an available (such as in MATLAB) random number
generator. Given the CDF F of a BE, we set F(t) = U and find the
corresponding t that satisfies t = F−1(U), where F−1 is the inverse
function of F7. This t corresponds to a sample failure-time of the
given BE. For example, if the BE has an exponential distribution
with failure rate λ, then F(t) = 1− e−λt and t = ln(1−U)−λ . Figure 3
illustrates pictorially the inverse transform method in the case of a
non-spare BE.
5.2 Spare BE Failure-time Sampling
When the BE is used as a spare, the inverse transform method is
slightly more involved. We need to sample a CDF of the form given
in Equation 5. In fact, this is done in two stages following these
steps:
1. Generate a uniformly-distributed random number U .
2. Sample the dormant distribution Fd using U .
3. If F−1d (U) ≤ a, then the BE fails while dormant and we take
F−1(U) = F−1d (U) as the valid failure-time sample.
4. If F−1d (U)> a, then the BE fails while active and consequently
we need to adjust the sampling8: When F−1d (U)> a, we have
U = F(t|a) = Fd(a)+Fa(t)−Fa(a). We set Y =U −Fd(a)+
Fa(a) = Fa(t) and finally, we take F−1a (Y ) as the valid failure-
time sample.
Figure 4 illustrates the sampling of a spare BE. The case where
F−1d (U) ≤ a is shown using U1 and the case where F−1d (U) > a is
shown using U2.
7Note that the closed-form of the inverse does not always exist. In this
case, we need to resort to some numerical methods to compute F−1(U).
8Knowing that a CDF is a non-decreasing function.
It is evident that in order to sample a spare BE failure distribution,
its activation time must be known. Therefore, one must first sample
all necessary distributions and propagate the needed failure-times to
compute the BE’s activation-time (c.f. Section 4).
5.3 Failure-times Propagation
Sampling the CDF of a gate boils down to propagating its inputs’
failure-times through the gate. Each gate has a propagation rule, that
is, given its inputs’ failure-times we compute the gate’s failure-time.
In the following, we show the rules for each of the DFT gates. Gen-
eralizing to any number of inputs is straightforward; however, due
to lack of space, we do not show this here.
- AND gate: AND(FT(A),FT(B)) = max(FT(A),FT(B)).
- OR gate: OR(FT(A),FT(B)) = min(FT(A),FT(B)).
- KofM gate: KofM(k,X) = sort(X)(k).
The KofM gate fails if at least k inputs out of m fail. X is a vector
of the inputs’ failure-times. sort(X) returns X sorted in increasing
order. Y(k) denotes the k-th element of vector Y.
- PAND gate:
PAND(FT(A),FT(B)) =
{
FT(B) if FT(A)≤ FT(B)
∞ if FT(A)> FT(B).
- Spare gate X with spare S:
Spare(FT(prim(X)),(FT(S),Taken)) =
AND(FT(prim(X)),FT(S)×Taken),
where Taken is a boolean value equals to 0 if the spare S has been
taken by another Spare gate (i.e. occurs when the spare is shared),
and 1 otherwise. ‘Taken’ is easily determined from the spare S
activation-time, the failure-time of the primary, and the activation-
time of X9. Intuitively, the Spare gate acts as the AND of its primary
and its spare if the latter is taken (used) by the Spare gate. If the
spare is taken by another Spare gate, then the Spare gate fails when
its primary fails; i.e. AND(FT(prim(X)),0) = FT(prim(X)).
- FDEP gate: This gate does not have a propagation rule as this gate
has a ‘dummy’ output. However, if a BE X is dependent upon a
trigger T its failure-time becomes OR(FT(X),FT(T )) as defined in
[1].
6 TOOL IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe the DFTSim tool, whose scheme is
shown in Figure 5. We use Matlab [10] to carry out the actual simu-
lation. The DFT is specified using the input language used in the
Galileo textual DFT format10. We use ANTLR [15] and Java to
generate a parser for the DFT input language. In order to achieve
this, we wrote a DFT grammar (DFTSim.g) from which DFTSim-
Lexer and DFTSimParser are automatically generated. We also im-
plemented various Java classes (DFTElements) which, for each DFT
element (the BE and the six types of gates), specifies which Mat-
lab command needs to be written (i.e. setting the activation-time
and the failure-time). DFTSim then uses DFTSimLexer, DFTSim-
Parser, and DFTElements to read an input DFT file (file.dft) and
compile the corresponding Matlab simulation file (file.m). In the
9The spare is taken by the Spare gate if AT(S)= FT(prim(X)) or AT(S)=
AT(X). Note that we run into non-determinism if simultaneous activations or
failures (e.g. through an FDEP gate) arise.
10The language has actually been augmented to support the extended DFT
formalism.
Matlab file, we basically write the Matlab commands for comput-
ing the activation-time and failure-time (according to the rules de-
scribed in Sections 4 and 5) of each element in the DFT. As ac-
tivation/failure time depends on other activation/failure times, the
order in which these commands are written is important11. These
commands also use some predefined Matlab functions, located in
DFTElements Matlab library, for sampling a BE and propagating
failure-times. All the samples (i.e. system failure-times) are col-
lected in a vector, and various measures are then output by Matlab,
such as the reliability (Equation 1), the confidence interval (Equa-
tion 2), etc. At this stage, DFTSim does not support two features
found in the Galileo tool, namely imperfect coverage12 and phased-
mission systems. However, DFTSim supports (like Coral) the spare-
extension and FDEP-extension, mentioned in Section 2.1, which are
not present in Galileo.
input/output
part of
automatically generated
DFTSimLexer
DFTSim.g
(grammar)
DFTSimParser
DFTElements
DFTElements
Matlab library
file.dft
DFTSim
file.m
Matlab
Unreliability
Computation time
Failure distribution
Confidence interval
Figure 5. Tool scheme for DFTSim.
7 CASE STUDIES
We have assessed DFTSim on a benchmark consisting of seven
case studies and compared the results with the Galileo and Coral
tools results. The seven cases studies are: The cascaded PAND sys-
tem (CPS), the cardiac assist system (CAS), the multi-processor dis-
tributed computer system (MDCS), three versions (standard, large,
and Weibull) of the fault tolerant parallel processors (FTPP), and
finally a modified version of the FTPP13.
The results are shown in Table 3. We ran all experiments (includ-
ing Galileo and Coral) on a Pentium 4 processor running at 3.2 GHz
with 2 GB of memory. The simulations were run with 10,000 and
100,000 samples (column three) and the relative error (i.e. the rela-
tive half width of the 95% confidence interval) is shown in column
six. Since Galileo and Coral are state-based analytical tools, we re-
port, in columns four and five, their largest (in terms of number of
states and transitions) state-space model obtained for each experi-
ment. Finally, we report the system unreliability and the computa-
tion time in columns seven and eight respectively.
11For this reason we do not allow cycles in the DFT which can be caused
by FDEP gates.
12This feature is however easy to implement.
13The DFT files are available on
http://fmt.cs.utwente.nl/projects/MOQS/DFTSim/benchmarks/
It is clear, from the result in Table 3, that the simulation time is
roughly linear with the number of samples N and the number of el-
ements E in the DFT (i.e. simulation time is O(NE)). As for the
memory consumption, given that we store all of the overall system
failure-time samples (i.e. the system failure distribution), it is also
linear in N. In general, simulation provides a quick way to compute
the order of magnitude of the measure of interest. Furthermore, sim-
ulation becomes the only feasible (in terms of computation time and
memory space) solution when E exceeds a certain value. Next, we
provide details on the various case studies.
7.1 The Cascaded PAND System
This is a simple hypothetical example, taken from [2] and shown
on Figure 6(a). All BEs have a constant failure rate equals to 1. Note
that in general the Coral tool leads to a smaller state-space given
its efficient compositional-aggregation technique for generating the
state-space [1].
7.2 The Cardiac Assist System
This system, taken from [1] and shown on Figure 6(b), consists of
three separate modules (i.e. CPU, motors, and pump units). Table 1
shows the failure rates of the various components. In addition, B is
a warm spare with a dormancy factor α = 0.5, and MB and PS are
cold spares (i.e. α = 0).
During analysis, the Galileo tool modularizes the DFT into three
independent modules (namely CPU, motors, and pump units) and
generates a separate CTMC for each one of them. Given the rela-
tively small size of these CTMCs, Galileo computation time for this
particular DFT is very short. This is not the case for Coral which
does not use modularization.
7.3 The Multi-processor Distributed Computer System
This case study is also taken from [1] and shown on Figure 6(c).
Table 2 shows the failure rates of its components. In addition, D12,
D22, and M3 have a dormancy factor α = 0.5.
Component CS SS P B MA MB MS PA PB PS
Rate 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.01 1 1 1
Table 1. Failure rates for CAS.
Component N P1,P2 D11,D12,D21,D22 M1,M2,M3
Rate 0.00002 0.005 0.8 0.0003
Table 2. Failure rates for MDCS.
7.4 The Standard Fault Tolerant Parallel Processors
This system, taken from [1], consists of 16 processors divided
into 4 logical groups. In each group, a processor is used as a shared
cold spare. A network element (NE) physically connects 1 processor
in each group (thus there are 4 NEs) to the rest of the system. The
failure of an NE makes the 4 processors connected to it unavailable
(i.e. essentially failed). The requirement is to have at least two pro-
cessors operational in each group. The DFT is shown on Figure 6(d),
where the processors are denoted with T and the network elements
with NE. All NEs have a failure rate equal to 0.017, and all proces-
sors have a failure rate equal to 0.11. The four spare processors are
cold spares.
Case Tool # of Max # Max # of Relative Unreliability Time
study samples of states transitions error (95%) (time = 1) (sec)
CPS Galileo 4113 24608 0.00135 490
Coral 133 465 0.00135 67
DFTSim 104 54% 0.00130 4
DFTSim 105 16% 0.00142 40
CAS Galileo 8 10 0.65790 1
Coral 36 119 0.65790 94
DFTSim 104 1% 0.65640 4
DFTSim 105 <1% 0.65651 43
MDCS Galileo 253 1383 0.06664 1
Coral 190 723 0.06664 82
DFTSim 104 7% 0.06490 4
DFTSim 105 2% 0.06737 39
FTPP Galileo 32757 426826 0.01922 13111
standard Coral 1325 14153 0.01922 193
DFTSim 104 14% 0.01920 10
DFTSim 105 4% 0.01981 98
FTPP Galileo - - - > 32400
large Coral 43105 654905 0.00306 329
DFTSim 104 30% 0.00420 12
DFTSim 105 12% 0.00268 121
FTPP Galileo 32757 426826 0.01287 10833
Weibull Coral
DFTSim 104 18% 0.01190 10
DFTSim 105 5% 0.01292 97
FTPP Galileo
complex Coral 1795448 34773150 0.02136 644719
DFTSim 104 13% 0.02390 24
DFTSim 105 4% 0.021012 234
Table 3. Results of the case studies.
Figure 6. The DFTs of the case studies.
7.5 The Large Fault Tolerant Parallel Processors
To illustrate even further the state-space explosion problem, we
took the FTPP system and made it slightly larger by considering 5
processors in each group (where 4 primaries share one spare, and
a group’s failure is described by a 3/4 voting gate) and 5 network
elements instead. The failure rates and dormancy factors remain the
same. Unfortunately, there are no results available from Galileo as it
ran ‘out of memory’ after 9 hours of computation.
7.6 The Weibull Fault Tolerant Parallel Processors
This system is the same as the standard FTPP except that the 4
NEs’ exponential distributions have been replaced by Weibull dis-
tributions with scale parameter equals 10.017 and shape parameter
equals 2. In this example, no results are available from Coral as this
tool currently supports only exponential distributions.
7.7 The Complex Fault Tolerant Parallel Processors
This case study is an extension to the FTPP system where each
of the processors (i.e. Ti j) is replaced by a complex element shown
on Figure 6(e), where CPU, M1, and M2 have a failure rate equal to
0.11 and α = 0. No results are available from the Galileo tool as this
kind of extended DFT can not be handled by Galileo.
8 RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
As prior work on DFT simulation, we mention the work in [5].
The difference with our work is: in [5], the underlying Markov chain
of the DFT model is simulated; whereas, in this paper we directly
simulate the DFT (see Section 3 on how our simulation methodology
works); furthermore, in [5], only the standard DFT formalism is used
as opposed to the extended DFT formalism used in our approach.
In [8], the authors present an FPGA-based (i.e. hardware-based as
opposed to our software-based simulation) simulation methodology
of a tree model called Time-To-Failure tree. The authors also show
that any static or standard dynamic fault tree can be translated into
a Time-To-Failure tree. However, in this work, sampling a spare BE
failure distribution remains problematic. In fact, in [8], and in some
simulation tools such as BlockSim [12]14 where a spare component
can be specified, the DFT notion of a dormancy factor is missing
and one specifies two distinct and independent CDFs for the com-
ponent’s dormant and active modes. In the DFT formalism, this is
of course not adequate as these two distributions are related and de-
pend on the dormancy factor α. In fact, as seen in Equations 4 and 5,
the dormant and active CDFs are derived given the in-isolation CDF
and the dormancy factor.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented DFTSim, a tool for extended DFT simulation.
As illustrated by the case studies, simulation of DFTs is a viable and
fast solution technique when only an estimate of the measures of in-
terest are required as opposed to exact values. Moreover, simulation
becomes the only practical technique, in terms of computation time
and memory consumption, when dealing with large DFTs.
However, one drawback of simulation is the increased number of
samples to be run in order to get meaningful results when dealing
14Although BlockSim does not simulate DFTs, but rather reliability block
diagrams and fault trees having some dynamic features such as spares.
with rare events (i.e. events that occur with a very low probabil-
ity). Fortunately, there are a number of techniques in order to alle-
viate this problem, most notably the importance sampling technique
[13][5]. One direction for future research is to investigate the appli-
cation of such a technique in the DFT context.
Another avenue of future work would be, given the standard DFT
format used in our tool, to integrate the DFTSim tool into other DFT
analysis tools such as Galileo or Coral and provide an alternative
simulation-based technique to be used in conjunction with analytical
techniques.
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